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POLITICAL SCIENCE

United Nations Techniques in the Middle East
W.

HARTLEY CLARK*

EDITOR'S Norn: This paper was prepared Jess than a year
after the 1967 Arab-Israel war and more than two years before the UN again became active in the Middle East with the
cease-fire proposal of 1970.

The first international peace force in history was
created by the United Nations (UN) at the time of the
Suez crisis. At the outset, it was the subject of scorn by
academicians. Julius Stone wrote in his book, Aggression
and World Order, that he could not see any role for international forces short of combat service. Possibly, too,
politicians were secretly scornful of the potentialities of
the UN emergency force, seeing it as a mock police organization created to replace the so-called Anglo-French
"police force" that had seized the Northern half of the
Suez Canal. It was thought that after a display of symbolic utility, the UN force could evaporate as quickly as
it had materialized.
The history of the UN force nevertheless seemed to have
changed world thinking about international peacekeeping, and the author of the plan, Canada's Lester
Pearson, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his
efforts. In time, the peace force idea was applied again
by the UN in the Congo, Indonesia, and Cyprus, engendering confidence in UN peace forces based on what was
considered successful completion of t11e missions . This
confidence is based on little else, however. There is a
mythology of peacekeeping that envisages a courageous
UN soldier rushing out between enemy lines, waving the
UN flag and shouting to the combatants to stop fighting.
Alas, the possibility for this kind of action is almost nil.
UN soldiers would, in most cases, be prevented by one
side or another from entering a combat zone.
To understand international policing, it is necessary
to survey the actual events in which it operated, and it
is particularly revealing to see the technique unfold in
the context of the environment in which it was first pragmatically evolved: that is to say, in Palestine.
International peacekeeping techniques had practically
no antecedent when in 1948, after the British withdrew
from Palestine, the UN created its first peace agency for
the area, the Truce Commission. Working under a directive from the Security Council, members of the commission had tried to go between the warring Arabs and
Jews to promote a truce. News dispatches reported that
one member lost two cars in that too dangerous game,
and Thomas Wasson, an American, was shot to death by
a sniper while returning home from a meeting of the
Commission. He was the first to lose his life in UN service-but the effort for a truce was fruitless.
The Security Council obtained a one-month truce in
May, 1948; and one foundation of that truce, as reported
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by Count Folke Bernadotte and by the Security Council,
was Arab acceptance of a freeze on Israel's importation
of men and arms as a condition for stopping the Arab
attack. This freeze was monitored by a neutral UN military group numbering about 1,000 (counting the crews
of patrol ships and planes). Allegations of Israeli infringement, especially false allegations, could be prevented from spiraling into new fighting by this monitoring, but the system could have broken down had some
party methodically ignored the freeze on men and material. At least the UN was preventing a breakdown over
imagined or distorted violations.
The second Palestine truce ordered by the Security
Council in July, 1948, was different. A strongly-worded
resolution, it was to be permanent, amounting to an end
to the war. Both sides now moved to consolidate their
positions, making it difficult for the UN peacekeeping personnel to make any contribution. UN personnel could
only protest as thousands of Arabs were forced to leave
their villages in Israeli-controlled territory and seek refuge in Transjordan. They could only protest as Arab
gunners made the Jerusalem road so dangerous for Israeli
supply convoys that it had to be abandoned and replaced
by a road exclusively within Israeli-controlled territory.
What brought international diplomatic pressure for an
armistice at the end of 1948 was the major fighting in
the Negev. With the futility characteristic of the second
truce, the UN personnel could not get the Egyptians to
allow lsraeli supply convoys bound for Jewish settk ments in the Negev to go across the Egyptian lines, as
required by the terms of truce. So the Israelis opened their
own way by means of an attack that pushed Egyptian
forces back into Sinai.
UN personnel did have some value in this end game,
and Israeli-Lebanese fighting in Western Galilee at about
the same time is a classic case. Each side blamed the
other for starting the fight, and each side said it wanted
to stop fighting but refused to do so unless the other side
did. Only the UN, with personnel on both sides of the
front, could talk with both and arrive at cease-fire terms
acceptable to them.
Armistice agreements were signed in 1949, and a new
day of effective operation had dawned for the UN peacekeeping personnel. But by 1951, a long-term problem
had emerged. Was the armistice agreement permanent?
The Israelis said no; it was just a transitional arrangement
looking toward a final peace treaty. The Arab governments rejected this thesis and insisted year after year on
their rights under the armistice agreements. At first the
UN peacekeeping personnel coped with the issue by urging the Israelis to prolong their observance of the armistice. For example, when in 1951, the Israeli moved Arab
farmers from a strip of land over which they (the
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Israelis) thought they had acquired full sovereignty, UN
officers supervised the return of the Arabs to their land.
In effect, the personnel had been instrumental in denaturing this feud over land as noted by Jacob Hurewitz
(1951),
Beginning in 1953 the Israeli's embarked on a policy
of raiding Arab nations, partly to even the score for acts
of violence and larceny in Israel by Arab infiltrators and
partly to prod the Arab governments into negotiating a
final settlement, according to Walter Eytan's account
(19 5 8) . The presence of UN officers set this policy off
its timetable, because a UN investigation of the first serious raid established that it had been perpetrated by
Israeli government forces, not by vengeful Israeli civilians, and the atrocities had been committed. World
opinion was shocked, and the Security Council censured
Israel. Moderates were then elevated to top positions of
power in Israel; but, since Arab infiltration continued,
the policy of raiding was resumed by Israel in 1955. After
this, the UN Chief of Staff, E.L.M. Burns, wrote: "I had
the feeling I was trying to stop a runaway truck on a
steep hill by throwing stones under its wheels." The
Egyptian f edayeen raids and the large scale introduction
of Soviet arms into Egypt added fuel to the fire, and the
Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 was the result.
Even before that outbreak, several political leaders
like Adl ai Stevenson and Eleanor Roosevelt had proposed
that one cause of Middle Eastern tension be removed by
erecting a barrier to infiltration across the borders of
Israel. That seemed to be the best measure available,
once the war had occurred, and minds were turned to
the problem of preventing any repetition. The presence
of the Anglo-French "police force" that had come to the
Suez Canal area purportedly to protect it from the Israelis
provided an ideal excuse for a UN force to take its place.
In basic concept the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) was an intelligent barrier. At first it was a barrier between Egyptian and withdrawing Anglo-French
forces capable of keeping the sides from shooting at one
another. It also was able to clear allied mines from the path
of the oncoming Egyptian army. Then UNEF became a
barrier between the Egyptian army and the allied forces
embarking at Port Said, intelligent enough to direct traffic,
keep civil peace and protect public utilities. Still later it
was a barrier between Egyptian forces and Israeli forces
withdrawing across the Sinai desert.
Ultimately UNEF became a barrier against infiltration
between Egypt and Israel along their common frontier, a
job earlier UN peacekeeping units had been incapable of
doing. Like the older UN units, UNEF worked to denature
small incidents, but to UNEF this counter-aggravation
work was an everyday, round-the-clock activity in which
the force had to succeed several times every day in separate incidents or not succeed at all. Along most of the
Israeli-Egyptian frontier, the old Palestine-Egypt border,
there was little chance of friction. The once-a-day jeep
patrol along this line was a task requiring more fortitude
than attentiveness. Throughout UNEF's decade the
Yugoslavian battalion insisted on keeping this oneorus
sector of the line as an on-going proof of their indefatiga-
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bility. A good share of their reports of violations
were crossings at one point on the line where Israeli military personnel and tourists stepped across to get an exceptionally good view of the Gulf of Aqaba, not visible
from the Israeli side. UNEF occassionally stepped in to
warn the Israelis they were violating the line, doing this
once j,ust moments before an Egyptian patrol appeared
and prepared for a fight, according to the UNEF daily
log.
The serious threat of infiltration was not here but along
the Gaza Strip . In December, 1948, the Israelis had been
unable to take the city of Gaza, thus leaving in Arab
hands a fertile strip on the Palestine coast adjacent to
Egypt. Into that small area about half a million human
beings were to be concentrated for two decades, most of
them as refugees from elsewhere. In the action and retaliation that triggered the 1956 war, the population pressure
in Gaza was an important part of the overall tension. The
Arab settlements were ideal targets for raids and artillery
bombardments, and the teeming Arab population took
vengeance into their own hands. Israel claimed that it
was Arab infiltration that provoked its raids on the Gaza
Strip. The UN saw that if infiltration could be stopped,
a pretext for the resumption of serious action could be
eliminated.
A desire for peace on both sides was fundamental to
the success on UNEF. The Israelis at first were reported
to have patrolled too close to the line and, on occassion,
to have crossed into the Gaza Strip. But in time they
came to trust the capability of UNEF to patrol the line.
The UN Secretary-General pointed out that at no time
did the Israelis give UNEF active cooperation or let them
onto Israeli soil, but they did pull Israeli forces away from
the line to give UNEF a freer hand . The Arab side was
usually cooperative throughout UNEF's history, a fact
that Israeli propagandists portrayed as Egypt hiding behind the UN's skirts. UNEF activity was confined to a
carefully marked zone of 500 meters adjacent to the
frontier in which arms were forbidden, and the growing
array of Arab military installations had to stay back of
that line. It was a difficult line; and any unauthorized
person who crossed the UNEF zone into the zone patrolled by the local military organization was certain of
instant apprehension in daylight and stood a good chance
of being greeted by bullets, not handcuffs. Moreover, the
Arab soldiers frequently violated the UNEF zone, sometimes in pursuit of an infiltrator they thought UNEF
had not seen and sometimes just to irritate UNEF.
The fifty meters closest to Israel were UNEF's own.
UNEF issued passes to Arabs who had to work agricultural land in that belt, but it apprehended an others found
there. Persons who wandered in from Arab side were
told to go back, but Arabs attempting to cross the Israeli
line or who crossed it and returned to the UNEF zone
were apprehended by UNEF. These and any Israelis who
crossed the line had to be handed over to the Egyptian
authorities for trial and punishment.
There were three ways UNEF could be outmaneuvered. First, surveillance at night was poor. The Swedish
UN troops had success with dogs at night, but they
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caused an unfavorable public reaction. Second, Arab infiltrators going into Israel could be stopped only in the
UNEF zone and could not be pursued into Israel by the
UNEF. Third, UNEF observer posts and patrols were
thinly manned, so any group that outnumbered them
was bound to get some or all of its members through the
UN zone and across the line. The only way UN reinforcements could be brought up was by means of notification
of a standby patrol, and that took time. If an infiltrator
struggled out of the grasp of a UNEF officer, he could
not be gunned down as he fled. UNEF weapons could be
used only in self-defense, and holding an infiltrator did
not count as self-defense. But UNEF personnel were
conspicuously armed with ready sten guns, and the fact
that they had cut down a number of would-be assailants
with their guns in the early days of the force created a
healthy respect for UNEF, we were told by E.L.M.
Burns.
The classic situation UNEF was working to avoid was
the crossing of the line by an amateur infiltrator, innocently or maliciously, and his getting hurt or hurting
someone on the other side, thus setting off a chain reaction of revenge that could escalate into a new war. As
UNEF's number dwindled from its maximum of 6,000
men in 1956 to a little more than ,half that number in
1967, its members had to be worked overly hard to keep
the line under continuous surveillance.
Just before the Middle Eastern war of 1967 broke out,
the frontier was the quietest it had ever been. Yet during
the two months immediately preceding the outbreak,
there were still only four days during which no incidents had been handled by UNEF.
In late 1966 and early 1967 there were reports of
crossings into Gaza by Israeli youths fleeing Israeli unemployment or the draft, and who refused to be repatriated to Israel. Normally, UNEF apprehended them as
they came across and handed them over to the Egyptian
liaison officer. In one case reported by the UN, an 18year-old from Israel penetrated 470 meters of the 500
meter UNEF patrol zone. Within a few steps he would
have been at the mercy of the Palestine Liberation Army
of Arab guerrillas, but UNEF caught him.
Another type of problem was caused by large groups
of Arabs who crossed the line to reap Israeli crops and
expected afterwards to return to thetr own side. They
feared that tangling with UNEF would mean a jail sentence, so they would make a run for it back into Gaza
when UNEF patrols appeared. What was UNEF to do?
It might cause the jailing of thirty breadwinners at a
time. Or, worse yet, the Arabs might decide to stay on
the Israeli side and get into trouble there. UNEF seemed
to handle this problem by frightening the groups back
into Gaza and seizing one or two persons as examples.
Single Arab infiltrators were caught regu ,larly by UNEF,
but sometimes it was on their homebound crossing after
having done their damage.
UNEF's most sensitive problem was to prevent direct
conflict between Israeli and Arab forces, and tense situations presented themselves from time to time. Splitsecond timing by UNEF was vital for a peaceful result.
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In May, 1965, for instance, an Israeli patrol took up a
position on their side of the line and a Palestine Liberation Army patrol appeared on the other side, inside the
UNEF zone. UNEF immediately interposed, facing down
the barrels of the Arab guns and backing the patrol out
of the zone. In October of that yea r, when twenty-five
Israelis had penetrated two kilometers into Egypt, Egyptian forces to the rear of UNEF opened up on them from
long range. When the Israelis responded to a UNEF order
to turn around, they were still fired upon as they retreated. Had UNEF not been there, the shooting might
have been more serious. When Arab military personnel
reckoned that UNEF had failed to spot an Israeli infiltrator, they moved into the UNEF zone illegally themselves. Often it became a race to see if UNEF could interpose itself between the two hostile parties before they
met within the UNEF zone.
In order to forestall confrontations, UNEF would do
almost anything. Once when an Israeli patrol vehicle got
stuck in the sand on its own patrol road, UNEF crossed
the line to help push it out so as to avoid tempting Arabs
to shoot at the apparently helpless vehicle. Normally,
UNEF maintained rigid discipline in refusing to have
relations of any sort with Israelis.
AJ,though it teetered on the edge of breakdown every
day for a decade, the peace along the armistice line was,
in fact, maintained by the overworked and often abused
UNEF. The war of 1967 was in no way related to conditions along this line. UNEF had done its job. Its capability for interposition between enemy units and for
discouraging and apprehending infiltrators was reliable.
At the time it was relieved of its function by the
Egyptian government in May, 1967, there was no possibility that UNEF might protest and stand fast, expecting to interpose between enemy units that had been ordered into battle. UNEF was set up to pacify a difficult
frontier between nations practically at peace, and all of
its techniques and its abilities relied on this peaceful
framework. Once war was invoked, their role vanished;
and their withdrawal became simply a question of protecting the lives of the members of UNEF. Unfortunately, when the time for withdrawal came, the improvisations
of the moment did not succeed in saving the lives of all
of UNEF, most of whom were still in Gaza when the
June war swept over them.
By the time UNEF was terminated, the UN had invented and practiced in the Middle East all of its various
peacekeeping techniques, with the main exception of the
combat techniques applied in the Congo. In general, these
techniques resulted in the delay of hostilities. Without UN
supervision of Israeli reinforcements during the first truce
in 1948, the truce might have broken down almost immediately. The kind of international action triggered by
UN observer reports on truce violations had an important dampening effect on the raiding and recrudescence
of violence in the Middle East after 1949. The character
of these raids might otherwise have been so obfuscated
by propaganda that the Great Powers might not have felt
able to take a stand. And the Arab-Israeli war of 1956
might have occurred, say, two years earlier. The war of
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1967 grew out of what were at first minor clashes along
the Israeli-Syrian border. It was UNEF that prevented
such clashes from occurring on the Israeli-Egyptian line,
and had there been a similar force on the Syrian border,
the 1967 war might have been delayed. And the delaying
and averting of hostHities are more similar in practice
than they are in concept, because for some unforeseen
reason a delayed war may never occur.
There is no grand or obvious rationale for the 1967
war. In it the Arabs lost assets while the Israelis gained
liabilities: the Arabs lost land it would be hard for Israel
to hold. Neither side found itself is an improved military
position regarding the other. If, in fact, some minor truce
violation or some equally irrational source of the carnage
could be identified, the 1967 war would serve to underscore the value of the diligent efforts of the UN to suppress minor causes. The war does not show the UN efforts
to have been useless-only inadequate.
Though small in number and power, the UN personnel
had a bearing on the peace because of the special situations in which they found themselves: being able to watch
contraband, to communicate with both sides to get ceasefire agreements, to fix blame impartially and to catch infiltrators . Looked at in isolation, these services are not
impressive; but, looked at in the context of what was
needed, the peace would have been as surely lost without
them as the poetic kingdom would have been lost for
want of a horseshoe nail. But will UN policing ever again
reach the proportions of UNEF? Until the Israelis withdraw from their newly won Arab lands, the front between
the two sides will be too volatile to permit UN policing.
But after a relaxation of tension in the area, there may be
police work for the UN.
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Notes
1. New York Times, May 22 and 23, 1948.
2. Count Folke Bernadotte, To Jerusalem (London: Hodder and Sloughton, 1951); and UN, Security Council, Official
Records, Supplement for June 1948, pp. 79-81.
3. UN, Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for
November 1948.
4. Incidents confronting UNEF are described on the basis
of the "Daily Log," the daily operations reports of UNEF.
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